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Abstract: This research aims to examine the role of the compensation scheme in 
mitigating the negative impact of social pressure on the creation of budgetary slack. 
There is an unclear phenomenon, how can compensation methods with pressure 
(penalty) be better able to reduce budgetary slack compared to compensation methods 
without penalty? This research contributes by validating the role of truth inducing and 
slack inducing compensation schemes in order to mitigate the budgetary slack through 
the perspective of expectancy theory. Results from an experimental study among 56 
undergraduate accounting students showed that obedience pressure tends to encourage 
individuals to create budgetary slack compared to while they experience pressure from 
their peers (H1). Another finding from this research is the tendency of individuals to 
create budgetary slack tends to be lower when they accept the slack inducing 
compensation mechanism than truth inducing (H2). These indicate that slack inducing 
compensation scheme is better used than truth inducing in mitigating the creation of 
budgetary slack. Different levels of risk faced by the individual, especially in the 
absence of fines or sanctions if the budget target is not reached, have different impacts 
on the individual. Our research provides practical implication when individuals receive 
stressed; compensation schemes are less effective in minimizing the effect of social 
pressure on the creation of budgetary slack  
 
Keywords: Budgetary Slack, Obedience Pressure, Peer Pressure, Compensation 
Scheme     
 
Abstrak— Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk menguji peran skema kompensasi dalam 
memitigasi dampak negatif tekanan sosial terhadap penciptaan budgetary slack. 
Terdapat fenomena yang masih belum jelas, bagaimana bisa metode kompensasi 
dengan tekanan/penalti (truth inducing) dapat lebih mampu mengurangi senjangan 
anggaran dibandingkan dengan metode kompensasi tanpa penalti (slack inducing)? 
Penelitian ini berkontribusi dengan memvalidasi peran skema kompensasi truth 
inducing dan slack inducing dalam meminimalisir terjadinya budgetary slack 
mengunakan perspektif teori ekspektasi. Hasil dari penelitian eksperimen 
menggunakan 56 mahasiswa S1 akuntansi menunjukkan bahwa obedience pressure 
cenderung mendorong individu untuk membuat budgetary slack dibandingkan  ketika 
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menerima peer pressure (H1). Temuan lain dari penelitian ini adalah kecenderungan 
individu untuk melakukan  budgetary slack cenderung lebih rendah ketika berada dalam 
skema kompensasi slack inducing dibandingkan truth inducing (H2). Hal ini 
menunjukkan bahwa skema kompensasi slack inducing terbukti lebih baik untuk 
digunakan dibandingkan dengan truth inducing dalam memitigasi terjadinya budgetary 
slack. Perbedaan tingkat risiko yang dirasakan oleh individu, khsususnya ketika 
terdapat denda atau sanksi tambahan jika target anggaran tidak tercapai, memberikan 
dampak yang berbeda terhadap individu. Penelitian kami memberikan implikasi 
praktis, ketika individu mendapat tekanan, skema kompensasi menjadi kurang efektif 
dalam meminimalisir pengaruh tekanan sosial terhadap penciptaan budgetary slack. 
 
Kata Kunci: Senjangan Anggaran, Tekanan Kepatuhan, Tekanan Rekan Sebaya, Skema 
Kompensasi.     
 
 
1. Introduction 
Budgeting becomes a serious concern for management and shareholders because it 
sets organization planning and future action that should be a guideline to achieve their 
goals or make several policy changes if needed. When under pressure, such as during 
the financial crisis, management has difficulty achieving the budget target and, 
therefore, have incentives to manipulate budget upward to meet predetermined targets 
and then to increase their chances of receiving a bonus (Assenso-Okofo et al., 2020).  
Nowadays, the budget also becomes a performance standard for an employee, so 
the achievable of the budget is a mandatory thing for the employee. One of the common 
fraud is done by an employee to achieve their budget easier is by creating budgetary 
slack. Budgetary slack is considered an unethical action (Hobson et al. 2011) because it 
sets performance targets lower than actual organizational capabilities (Douglas and 
Wier, 2000).  
Social pressure encourages the occurrence of budgetary slack (DeZoort and Lord, 
1997). Lord and DeZoort (2001) find that social pressure raises conformance, the desire 
of individuals to avoid the negative consequences of acting disloyally towards someone 
whose position of authority is higher or acting following the wishes of the group. Davis 
et al. (2006) find that financial managers are proven to create budgetary slack when 
receiving pressure from superior, even though the managers are aware that their actions 
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are wrong and contrary to their duties. In addition to pressure from superiors, pressure 
from peer pressure also plays a role in influencing the creation of budgetary slack, even 
though it is not as strong as encouragement from superiors or higher authorities. Chong 
and Syarifuddin (2010) provide evidence that accountants who experience pressure 
from colleagues tend to make unethical decisions that harm the company.  
Budgetary slack can also be influenced by compensation scheme that applies in 
organizations, especially when compensation scheme is applied based on the 
achievement of the budget plans that have been prepared (Kramer and Hartman, 2014). 
The compensation scheme will bridge the interests of the principal and agent (Chen et 
al., 2001). Pepper and Gore (2015) argue that the interests of principals and their agents 
are likely to be harmonized if the individual is motivated to do their best. Langevin and 
Mendoza (2012) emphasize that, if the compensation scheme is considered unfair, it can 
lead managers to behave in a way that is harmful to the organization. For example, it 
may lead managers to have unethical behaviors. The agency theory perspective 
emphasizes that individuals are rational beings and will always be selfish by 
maximizing their welfare (Evans III et al. 2001). 
Compensation scheme introduced as a control system to minimize budgetary slack. 
Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1994) explains that subordinates will be motivated to being 
excellent if it is related to the number of rewards offered by superiors in accordance with 
their expectancy. Hobson et al. (2011) introduced truth inducing pay schemes and slack 
inducing pay schemes as an alternative compensation scheme for reducing budgetary 
slack.   
Waller (1988) found that budgetary slack tends to be smaller when companies use 
truth inducing scheme. Similar results were also presented in Chow et al. (1988), which 
stated that truth inducing compensation scheme could effectively reduce budgetary 
slack based on past performance budgets. Steven (2002); Fisher et al. (2002); Efrilna 
(2018); Sampouw (2018) also supported this result that truth inducing compensation 
scheme more able to reduce the number of the budgetary slack that made by 
subordinates than the slack inducing compensation scheme. 
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These results provide a question for further research, how can compensation 
methods with pressure (penalty) be better able to reduce budgetary slack compared to 
compensation methods without penalty? Young (1985) suggests that when individuals 
(subordinates) are in a condition of uncertainty, then individuals will try to avoid risk 
(risk-averse) compared to individuals who do not experience conditions of uncertainty. 
Young (1985) examined the effect of risk on the budgetary slack and provided evidence 
that subordinates who were risk-averse tended to make larger budgetary slack than non-
risk averse subordinates. In the context of truth inducing compensation scheme and 
slack inducing scheme, while faced with pressure fines or salary reductions, individuals 
who tend to risk-averse will avoid these fines and will eventually try to avoid these risks. 
When subordinates are unable to reach the budget target, the risk-averse subordinates 
tend to do budgetary slack to avoid the risk of salary reduction. On the other hand, in 
slack inducing compensation schemes, without reducing pressure, individuals do not 
experience conditions of uncertainty and pressure to reduce salaries, so they are 
predicted not to make budgetary slack. 
This topic becomes very interesting to be examined, especially related to the 
pressure experienced by individuals on truth inducing. Indirectly, truth inducing 
compensation schemes can also be the compliance pressure, which also provides 
additional pressure for individuals. Contrary to truth inducing, the risk of getting this 
fine is not found in slack inducing, so it is believed to minimize the occurrence of 
budgetary slack than truth inducing. Because, if the budget target fails to be achieved, 
the slack inducing compensation scheme will only abolish the provision of bonuses 
without reducing the basic salary. 
Using 56 accounting students in experimental research, this research wants to 
examine how compensation scheme (truth inducing and slack inducing) can mitigate 
social pressure effects on budgetary slack creation. This research also investigates 
which social pressure (obedience pressure or peer pressure) and compensation scheme 
(truth inducing or slack inducing) have more influence in reducing budgetary slack 
creation. This research adopts a social pressure case scenario by Hartman and Mass 
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(2010) and tries to measure the different effects of social pressure from superiors and 
peers that have not been measured in other research before.  
This research also tried to validate previous studies such as Waller (1988); Chow et 
al. (1988); Steven (2002); Fisher et al. (2002); Efrilna (2018); Sampouw (2018) who 
believed that the truth inducing compensation scheme was able to reduce the size of the 
budgetary slack made by subordinates than slack inducing compensation scheme. In 
addition, this research wants to examine different perspectives regarding the possibility 
of a slack inducing compensation scheme that can reduce budgetary slack based on 
Young's argument (1985). 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis Development  
Since the budget always used as a performance measurement tool, budgetary slack 
usually becomes an important issue in the organization. Budgetary slack is the 
difference between the amount of budget submitted by subordinates and the best number 
of estimates that have been submitted and made at the time of budgeting (Anthony & 
Govindarajan, 2007). Budgetary slack is created when subordinates downplay their 
abilities or the ability of business units to be included in the budget target (Hobson et 
al. 2011). Subordinates will downplay their productive abilities to ensure the 
achievement of standards set in the target (Young, 1985). Budgetary slack can be 
created by overestimating cost estimates, minimizing revenue estimates, and reducing 
production capacity. Management accountants do budgetary slack in this case so that 
the budget can be more easily achieved. Practices like this will certainly cause losses 
for the company in the future.  
Many factors affect these unethical actions; one of them is the pressure from the 
supervisor or co-workers-workers. The relationship among peers unwittingly creates a 
social pressure that influences one another. Kelman (1958), through social influence 
theory, explains that individuals can change their behavior to adjust demand from their 
social environment, one of which is pressure from superiors and pressure from peers. 
Individuals can change their selves to meets the demands of a social environment. It 
takes many forms and can be seen in conformity, socialization, obedience pressure, peer 
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pressure, and persuasion (Kelman, 1958).  
Milgram (1965) states that subordinates will act not on their own desires but 
because they have to fulfill the desires of figures who are considered to have high 
authority. Individuals subjected to obedience pressure will make a decision contrary to 
their attitudes, beliefs, and values because they can remove themselves from 
responsibility for their judgments and decisions after an individual with authority directs 
them to action (Milgram, 1965; 1974).  Meanwhile, peer pressure as an alternative form 
of social influence pressure refers to behavior affected by equals or peers. Peer pressure 
comes with the situation when people conform in normative influence situations 
because they fear negative consequences if they appear deviant from others (Bhrem and 
Kassin, 1990; Deutsch and Gerrard, 1955; Lord and De Zoort, 2001). Therefore, social 
pressure, such as obedience pressure and peer pressure, will encourage budgetary slack 
creation because the employee feels pressure and afraid to their supervisor or figures 
who have high authority and their team (peer). 
Compensation scheme introduced as a control system to minimize budgetary slack. 
Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1994) explains that subordinates will be motivated to being 
excellent if it is related to the number of rewards offered by superiors in accordance with 
their expectancy. Hobson et al. (2011) introduced truth inducing pay scheme and slack 
inducing pay scheme as an alternative compensation scheme. Truth inducing 
compensation scheme is compensation with a reward if the employee can achieve their 
target and penalty if they did not achieve, meanwhile slack inducing compensation 
scheme is compensation with reward but without penalty. Compensation scheme as 
management control systems is an important tool to minimize budgetary slack that arose 
from social pressure. 
 
2.1. Obedience Pressure Vs. Peer Pressure on Budgetary Slack 
Social pressure has been used to predict individual behavior in making formal 
decisions. Battison and Gamba (2016) show that social pressure can be a positive 
pressure, resulting in beneficial and beneficial decisions. On the other hand, social 
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pressure can also be a negative pressure or improper order that result in adverse 
decisions. Obedience Pressure (Milgram, 1965; Davis et al. 2006) is social pressure 
originated from individuals who have a bigger influence and authority, such as 
supervisor or manager.    
Milgram (1965) states that subordinates will act not on their own desires but 
because they have to fulfill the desires of figures who are considered to have high 
authority. Davis et al. (2006) found that almost half of the financial managers who were 
participants in the experiment proved to have budgetary slack when getting pressure 
from superiors. Although actually, the managers are aware that the actions they take are 
wrong and contrary to their duties. The individual will be willing to behave in a way 
that is deviant from his position, beliefs, and values because other individuals with 
higher authority have controlled him.  
Meanwhile, peer pressure (Lord and DeZort, 2001; Chong and Syarifuddin, 2010) 
is a social pressure that comes from colleagues. Lord and DeZoort (2001) research found 
that social pressures lead to conformance, the desire of individuals to avoid the negative 
consequences of acting disloyal towards someone whose position of authority is higher 
or not following the wishes of the group. Peer pressure is not usually as strong as the 
obedience pressure in influencing someone because of the absence of a range of forces 
in this type of pressure (Lord and DeZort, 2001). Nevertheless, the theory of social 
influence in accounting research states that pressure can influence the auditor's 
judgment in facing an ethical dilemma. Research by Chong and Syarifuddin (2010) 
shows evidence that accountants who experience pressure from peers tend to make 
unethical decisions that harm the company.  
Huddart and Qu (2014) found that the manager's honesty would diminish when he 
found other peer managers acting dishonestly. On the other hand, the manager's honesty 
will increase when he finds the behavior of other manager peers to be honest in 
reporting. Cannon and Thornock (2018) also show that peer pressure can also have a 
large influence on decisions taken by managers in the budgeting process. This happens 
because managers feel part of a group with a peer, especially when dealing with the 
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same situation. So, the manager's actions will adjust to the action of another peer 
manager (Turner et al., 1987).  
There is limited research that measures and compares the differential impact of 
social pressure on individual behavior in the budgeting process (research on social 
pressure usually only uses one type of social pressure or uses a combination of social 
pressure). So, this research tries to compare the different effects of social pressure on 
budgetary slack creation. Based on these arguments, we formulated the hypothesis as 
follows: 
H1: Budgetary slack tends to be higher when individuals receive obedience pressure 
than peer pressure. 
 
2.2 Truth Inducing Vs. Slack Inducing on Budgetary Slack 
 Budgetary slack can also be influenced by compensation scheme that applies in 
organizations, especially when compensation scheme is applied based on the 
achievement of the budget plans that have been prepared (Kramer and Hartman, 2014). 
Although, Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) find that bank CEOs whose incentives are 
aligned with the interests of shareholders do not perform any better than those whose 
incentives are not aligned, Bhuyan, et al. (2020) who examined compensation schemes 
in the insurance industry found that compensation schemes are closely related to the 
company's financial performance in the future. 
The agency theory perspective suggests that individuals are rational beings and will 
always be selfish by maximizing their personal welfare (Evans III et al. 2001).  Reward 
offered by leaders will affect the performance of subordinates. According to expectancy 
theory (Vroom, 1994), subordinates will be motivated to excel if it is related to the 
number of rewards offered by superiors in accordance with their expectancy. However, 
in reality, the amount of compensation received is not always as expected. When the 
method of reward or compensation offered to subordinates is not informed, it will result 
in a decrease in performance. In one way, compensation settings that do not help in 
solving agency problems but perhaps exacerbate them (Van Essen et al., 2015). 
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Likewise, if subordinates do not present the actual potential of the budget, it can result 
in the emergence of budgetary slack.  
Compensation paid either to superiors or subordinates can motivate the occurrence 
of a moral hazard if the calculation or compensation method is not in accordance with 
what is expected either by superiors or subordinates (Chow et al., 1988). For superiors 
and subordinates: the more risks are borne, the higher the expected compensation. 
Carreras and Naranjo-Gril's (2014) found empirical evidence that bonus incentives 
cause individuals to justify any means to get bonuses, including creating budgetary 
slack. 
The Truth Inducing Pay scheme (Hobson et al., 2011) is a compensation payment 
scheme where subordinates will receive maximum compensation if the actual output is 
the same as the budgeted or proposed production plan. If the actual result is smaller than 
the proposal, so the subordinates will be fined or penalized. Hobson et al. (2011) provide 
an example of a formula for calculating truth inducing payment scheme:  
P = $0.10B + $0.05 (A – B) , if A > B, 
P = $0.10B - $0.15 (A – B),   if A <  B. 
Meanwhile, slack inducing the Pay Scheme or fixed pay plus Bonus is a 
compensation method where subordinates are paid by a fixed salary plus a bonus if the 
output exceeds the target and without penalty. If the production is less than the target, 
they will receive compensation in the form of a fixed salary only. Hobson et al. (2011) 
also provide an example of a formula for calculating slack inducing payment scheme:  
P=$0.10B + $0.05(A–B),   if A>B, 
P=$0.10B,                             if A< B. 
Waller (1988) found that the budgetary slack occurs to be smaller when companies 
use truth inducing methods. Similar results were also presented in Chow et al. (1988), 
which stated that truth inducing compensation scheme could effectively reduce 
budgetary slack based on past performance budgets. Steven (2002) and Fisher et al. 
(2002) also supported this result that truth inducing compensation scheme more able to 
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reduce the size of the budgetary slack that made by subordinates than the slack inducing 
compensation scheme. 
Research on compensation schemes in Indonesia also shows the same 
direction, where the slack inducing compensation scheme will create larger 
budgetary slack than truth inducing compensation scheme (Efrilna, 2018; 
Sampouw, 2018). Truth inducing scheme has a mechanism that can make higher 
budgetary slack, where additional reward or sanctions for the achievement of the target 
or not reached will motivate the subject to propose a budget with real abilities and then 
make the subject motivated to achieve the budgeted target (Palupi and Mulyatno, 2014).  
There is another perspective on this compensation scheme. Contrary with all 
researcher who argues that truth is inducing able to reduce budgetary slack, Young 
(1985) gives another perspective. Young (1985) suggests that when individuals 
(subordinates) are in a condition of uncertainty, then individuals will try to avoid risk 
(risk-averse) compared to individuals who do not experience conditions of uncertainty. 
Young (1985) examined the effect of risk on the budgetary slack and provided evidence 
that subordinates who were risk-averse tended to make larger budgetary slack than non-
risk averse subordinates. In the context of truth inducing compensation scheme and 
slack inducing scheme, while faced with pressure penalty or salary reductions, 
individuals who tend to risk-averse will avoid these fines and will eventually try to avoid 
these risks. When subordinates are unable to reach the budget target, the risk-averse 
subordinates tend to do budgetary slack to avoid the risk of salary reduction. 
On the slack inducing, the risk of getting this penalty is not found, so it is believed 
can minimize the occurrence of budgetary slack than truth inducing. Because of the 
budget target fails to be achieved, the slack inducing compensation scheme will only 
abolish the provision of bonuses without reducing the basic salary. Therefore, the 
bottom manager (management accountant) of budget compilers will tend to create slack 
on the proposed budget in truth inducing scheme. This is because in addition to the 
bottom manager (management accountant) the budget compiler is motivated to get a 
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bonus; it is also more influenced because it avoids the risk of getting a fine if the actual 
performance results fail to reach the proposed budget target. 
In general, participatory budgeting is at risk of encouraging employees to carry out 
budgetary slack. However, the different compensation schemes used to provide a 
different level of a tendency to do budgetary slack. Based on this explanation, we 
formulated the hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Budget slack tends to be lower in slack inducing compensation schemes than truth 
inducing 
 
2.3. Effects of Social Pressure and Compensation Scheme on Budgetary Slack 
One way to make budgeting easier is to create budgetary slack, which Webb 
(2002) translates as a performance target that is deliberately made more than the 
expected level. Davis et al. (2006) evaluated the vulnerability to obedience pressure 
for management accountants to create budgetary slack in violation of company policy. 
This indicated that participants who added slack to the initial budget recommendations 
found their own lack of responsibility for a budget decision that had been made 
compared to participants who refused to add slack. 
Emett et al. (2019) found evidence that individuals adjust to the actions of selfish 
peers that lead to a gradual movement towards non-compliance with management's 
expectations or regulatory requirements in an accounting context. Individuals are 
vulnerable to peer influence because they join with a peer in making the report (Brunner 
and Ostermaier, 2019). This happens because social pressure leads to conformance, the 
desire of individuals to avoid the negative consequences of acting disloyally towards 
someone whose position of authority is higher or not following the wishes of the group 
(Lord and DeZoort, 2001) 
The compensation scheme that applies to the company plays a vital role in the 
creation of budgetary slack.  Social pressure will be stronger when the compensation 
scheme used has a large influence on compensation to be obtained by all members of 
the company. So, every budget decision that will be taken can have a broad impact on 
all individuals in the company. The use of different compensation schemes is believed 
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to have different social pressure effects. 
Truth inducing compensation scheme is looked riskier for company employees 
than slack inducing compensation scheme. This happens because if the company's 
performance fails to reach the target, so truth inducing compensation will provide a 
penalty in the form of deducting the basic salary of management or company 
employees. On the other side, the slack inducing compensation scheme will only 
abolish Bonus giving without reducing basic salary (Waller, 1988; Chow et al., 1988) 
So, many researchers believe, including Fisher et al. (2002); Efrilna (2018); Sampouw 
(2018), that truth inducing compensation scheme more able to reduce the size of the 
budgetary slack that made by subordinates than the slack inducing compensation 
scheme. 
Young's (1985) examined the effect of risk on the budgetary slack and found the 
result, if subordinates are in a condition of uncertainty, then the risk-averse subordinates 
tend to make a larger budgetary slack than non-risk averse subordinates. While the slack 
inducing risk of getting this fine (penalty) is not found, so it is believed to minimize the 
occurrence of budgetary slack than truth inducing. Therefore, in truth inducing, 
managers under budget compilers will tend to create slack on the proposed budget 
because besides being motivated to get bonuses, they are also more influenced because 
they avoid the risk of obtaining fines if the actual performance results fail to reach the 
proposed budget target. Based on this explanation, we formulated the hypothesis as 
follows: 
H3: The compensation scheme moderates the effect of social pressure on budgetary 
slack. 
H3a: Budget slack tends to be lower in slack inducing compensation scheme than truth 
inducing when individuals receive obedience pressure. 
H3b: Budgetary slack tends to be lower in slack inducing compensation schemes than 
truth inducing when individuals receive peer pressure 
We describe the relationship between the variables in the following research model: 
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Figure 1 
Conceptual Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Research Method 
3.1. Research Design  
This research uses an experimental method to explain the causal relationship 
between social pressure and compensation schemes towards the creation of budgetary 
slack. This research used 2x2 factorial design between the subject with social pressure 
(obedience pressure and peer pressure) as an independent variable, compensation 
schemes (truth inducing and slack inducing) as moderating variable and budgetary slack 
as the dependent variable. Table 1 below shows the experimental design clearly.  
Table 1  
Experimental Design 
 
Factor dan Level 
Compensation Scheme 
Truth Inducing Slack Inducing 
Social Pressure 
Obedience Pressure 14 Participants 14 participants 
Peer Pressure 14 Participants 14 Participants 
 
3.2 Research Participants 
The participants in this experiment were 62 accounting students who had taken the 
management accounting subject. So they were considered to have sufficient ability to 
understand and work on experimental cases regarding budgeting, one of the subjects of 
Management Accounting. The budgeting process includes budgetary slack has been 
explained well in Management Accounting subject. Therefore, students can able to 
internalize the situation and understand this issue. Khera and Benson (1970) explain that 
Social Pressure 
(Obedience Pressure  
& Peer Pressure) 
Compensation Scheme 
(Truth Inducing & 
 Slack Inducing) 
 
Budgetary Slack 
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college students could be chosen as participants because students can act like a 
businessman when they understand and can internalizing experimental tasks clearly. 
This research uses a simple budgeting case instrument, so the use of accounting student 
participants is believed to be sufficiently capable of internalizing understanding of the 
case. This research uses participants from private universities in Lampung because the 
student rarely involved in experimental research. This condition is chosen to minimize 
the demand effect, the situation in which participants can act unnatural (Nahartyo and 
Utami, 2016).   
 
3.2. Experiment Procedure  
Before the experiment took place, participants were divided randomly from one of 
the four existing case scenario packages: 
 Obedience Pressure – Truth Inducing 
 Obedience Pressure – Slack Inducing 
 Peer Pressure – Truth Inducing 
 Peer Pressure – Slack Inducing  
In the initial stage, participants will receive general information regarding the 
company and its role in P.T. Prima Jaya Otoparts. Participants will also get information 
about budget realization over the past three years for the 2019 budgeting process. In the 
next stage, participants will be explained the compensation scheme that applies to the 
company. To validate understanding regarding compensation schemes, participants are 
given the task of calculating how much compensation they will receive if the company's 
target is reached or fails to achieve. 
On the next stage, participants will receive pressure from their superiors or peers 
to revise the budget targets to be more easily achieved. The dilemma in making this 
decision is the important point in this experiment. The final decision of the participants 
how much the budget is proposed. The researcher will see whether the participant's 
answer contains slack or not and then calculates the amount of slack produced. 
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1. Data and Demography 
The data that could be processed were 56 participants (15 male and 41 female) 
because six respondents failed to pass the manipulation check (9.6%). The average age 
of participants is 21.09 years with a minimum age is 19 years, and the maximum age is 
23 years. Some participants have work experience of around 1-3 years.  
All participants get a random assignment to eliminate and reduce the bias due to 
differences in participant characteristics (Nahartyo and Utami, 2016). Randomization 
testing using Chi-Square showed a significance value of 0.801 (p> 0.05) for the gender 
variable, 0.960 (p> 0.05) for the age variable, and 0.845 (p> 0.05) for the work 
experience variable. The randomization test results showed that there were no 
differences between manipulation groups based on sex, age, and work experience (p> 
0.05). 
Table 2 
Randomized Test Result 
 
Demography Characteristics 
Budgetary Slack 
Pearson Chi-Square Sign. 
Sex 1.002 0.801 
Age 4.942 0.960 
Work Experience 4.876 0.845 
 
These demography factors were tested to ensure that participants' demography 
characteristics (gender, age, work experience) do not affect the dependent variable. This 
research using one-way ANOVA to test gender and linear regression to test age and 
work experience to the dependent variables. The test results show that there is no 
influence of demography characteristics, which are sex, age, and work experience on 
the dependent variable. One-way ANOVA test for sex variables on budgetary slack has 
a significance value of 0.114 (p> 0.05). The linear regression test results for the age 
variable has value of 0.066 (p> 0.05) and work experience 0.341 (p> 0.05). Based on 
this result, there is no influence of participant demography characteristics on the 
budgetary slack variable. 
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Table 3 
Test Results the Effect of Demography Characteristics on Dependent Variable 
 
Demography Characteristics 
Budgetary Slack 
F Sign. 
Sex 2.584 0.114 
Age 3.531 0.066 
Work Experience 0.924 0.341 
 
4.2. Result  
The results of testing hypothesis 1 in table 2 show the significance of 0.047 (p <0.05), 
which means that hypothesis 1 is statistically supported. Individuals tend to do higher 
budgetary slack when receiving social pressure from superiors than social pressure from 
peers. The average statistical test shown in table 3 supports this result. The average 
budgetary slack that occurs is higher in the condition of obedience pressure, 73.21 
compared to the condition of peer pressure, 46.25.  
Table 4 
Hypothesis testing results (Two Ways ANOVA) 
 
Source df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3 7446.875 3.040 0. 037 
Intercept 1 199804.018 81.565 0.000 
Pressure 1 10179.018 4.155 0.047** 
Compensation 1 9911.161 4.046 0.049** 
Pressure*Compensatio
n 
1 2250.446 0.919 0.342 
Error 52 2449.622   
Total 56    
Corrected Total 55    
R Square = 0.149 (Adjusted R Squared = 0.100)  
** Sig at 5% level. 
 
The two-way ANOVA test result gives a significance value of 0.049 (p <0.05), 
which means that hypothesis 2 is supported statistically. Budgetary slack tends to be 
lower in slack inducing compensation schemes compared to truth inducing 
compensation schemes. The statistics also provide support for this. Table 3 shows that 
the average budgetary slack tends to be lower in the slack inducing compensation 
scheme (46.43) compared to the truth inducing compensation scheme (73.04). 
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Table 5 
Statistical Mean of Budgetary Slack for Each Manipulation Condition 
 
Pressure Mean 
Std. 
Error 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Obedience Pressure 73.21 9.35 54.45 91.98 
Peer Pressure 46.25 9.35 27.48 65.02 
Compensation 
Slack Inducing 46.43 9.35 27.66 65.20 
Truth Inducing 73.04 9.35 54.27 91.85 
Pressure Compensation     
Obedience Pressure 
Truth Inducing 92.86 13.23 66.31 119.04 
Slack Inducing 53.57 13.23 27.03 80.12 
Peer Pressure 
Truth Inducing 53.21 13.23 26.67 79.76 
Slack Inducing 39.29 13.23 12.74 65.83 
 
Figure 2  
Interaction Plot of Pressure and Compensation 
 
The results of testing hypothesis 3 in table 2 show that the mean difference is not 
statistically significant, with a significance value of 0.342 (p> 0.05). Based on the 
hypothesis testing, there is no influence on the interaction between social pressure and 
compensation schemes on budgetary slack. This is reinforced by the interaction plot in 
Figure 2, that there is no pattern of interaction formed between social pressure and 
compensation schemes towards budgetary slack. Based on this, hypothesis 3 is stated to 
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be not supported. Therefore, the testing of the simple effects (H3a and H3b) cannot be 
done because there are no interaction effects of H3.   
 
4.2. Discussion 
The tendency of budgetary slack creation is higher when individuals get pressure 
from superiors than pressure from peers (H1). This result can be explained by social 
influenced theory (Kelman, 1958), which said that individuals could change their 
behavior to adjust demand from their social environment, one of which is pressure from 
superiors and pressure from co-workers-workers.  
This research also supported Milgram (1965), which argued that individuals would 
be willing to behave in ways that deviated from their beliefs and values because they 
had control from other individuals with higher authority. Deviant behavior due to more 
authoritative party actions is caused by agency shifts, namely changes in individual 
psychology from psychological autonomy to agentic conditions. The condition of 
psychological autonomy is a condition when subordinates have the capacity and ability 
to determine their own fate and actions (self-determination). While the agentic condition 
is the condition when the subordinate loses self-determination because there is power 
from the superior, who asks him to take certain actions (Milgram, 1965), thus when an 
agentic shift occurs, subordinates will act not on their own desires but because they have 
to fulfill the desires of figures who are considered to have high authority.  
The results of this research supported the research of Davis et al. (2006). Davis et 
al. (2006) supported this hypothesis, in which most financial managers were proven to 
do budgetary slack when they were under pressure from superiors, even though they 
were aware that the action was wrong. Lord and DeZoort (2001) provide similar results. 
Research Lord and DeZoort (2001) suggest that social pressure raises conformance, 
namely the desire of individuals to avoid negative consequences due to acts of disloyalty 
towards someone with higher authority. These results contribute empirically to the 
literature on social pressure by providing empirical evidence related to research on 
social pressure originating from superiors and co-workers-workers in their influence on 
the creation of budgetary slack. 
Mirza and Adi 
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
201 
 
Hypothesis 2 predicts that budgetary slack tends to be lower in slack inducing 
compensation schemes than truth inducing. These results can be explained through the 
theory of expectancy (Vroom, 1994). Expectancy theory (Vroom, 1994) suggests that 
the willingness of individuals to take certain actions is often influenced by the 
consequences that will be obtained due to the actions they take. When the expected 
consequences are more favorable, then the individual's interest in carrying out these 
actions will be even higher.  
Truth inducing compensation scheme (Hobson et al., 2011) is a compensation 
payment scheme where subordinates will receive maximum compensation when they 
can achieve results following previously set targets. In the context of the budget, 
subordinates will receive maximum compensation when they can achieve the budget 
targets. In line with the theory of expectancy (Vroom, 1994), when faced with maximum 
compensation, subordinates will try to reach the budget target and make budgetary slack 
because they feel pressured for the penalty given. Conversely, in the slack inducing 
compensation mechanism (Hobson et al., 2011), subordinates are paid a fixed salary 
plus a bonus if they reach the target, but no penalties are given. This condition causes 
budgetary slack to be lower in slack inducing compensation than the truth inducing 
compensation scheme because subordinates do not feel pressured about fines given 
when they do not reach the budget target. 
Result of this research reinforces Young's (1985) which suggests that subordinates 
who face a high risk of uncertainty (penalties in truth inducing schemes), then 
subordinates avoid these risks (risk-averse) and tend to do budgetary slack compared to 
subordinates who do not experience uncertainty (incentive scheme slack inducing). 
Contrary with Waller (1988), Chow et al., (1998), Steven (2002) and Fisher (2002), this 
research contributes to literature which explains the phenomenon of budgetary slack 
through the perspective of expectancy theory and provides empirical contributions in 
order to strengthen Young's (1985). 
Hypothesis 3 is not supported, which means that there is no interaction effect of 
the incentive scheme on the influence of social pressure on the creation of budgetary 
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slack. Several reasons can explain these results. First, through a normative social 
influence perspective (Aronson et al., 2005) that social influence will influence 
individuals to conform in groups to be accepted by other group members. In the context 
of social pressure on budgetary slack, the absence of moderation in the incentive scheme 
can be explained by a normative social influence perspective. Social influence in the 
form of social pressure tends to be stronger to influence individual behavior so that 
compensation schemes are less able to mitigate social pressure towards the creation of 
budgetary slack. 
Second, the lack of support for the interaction of incentive schemes against social 
pressure on budgetary slack can be explained through a framework of moral reasoning 
and personal value. Hobson et al. (2011) suggest that slack inducing compensation 
schemes have proven to create a moral framework by placing economic interests on 
social norms to maintain a sense of honesty and responsibility. However, regardless of 
the compensation scheme, most participants want a budget that reflects the production 
they expect. Rankin et al. (2008) and Schatzberg and Stevens (2008) argue that moral 
judgments of budgetary slack, whether it is ethical or not, depends on the effect of 
framing felt by each individual. 
Financial incentives play a role in determining the moral framework due to 
perceived pressure on budget planning. However, personal values determine how 
individuals respond to these moral frameworks and determine what actions will be 
taken. So, the decision to make budgetary slack under pressure conditions, not only 
based on financial incentives but on the personal value of each individual. Each 
individual will respond differently to the financial incentives provided. Therefore, 
regardless of the type of compensation scheme provided, the moral and personal values 
of each individual determine their actions regarding budget planning decisions. Morality 
is the most effective and efficient control for the behavior of self-interest that should 
not be ignored by economists and accountants (DeGeorge, 1992; Stevens and 
Theravajan, 2010). 
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5. Conclusion, Implication, and Limitation 
5.1. Conclusion 
This research aims to examine the effects of compensation schemes and their 
interactions with social pressure on the creation of budgetary slack. Research results 
show that budgetary slack tends to be higher when individuals get pressure from 
superiors than pressure from co-workers-workers. This is because individuals 
(subordinates) feel the agency shifts. Subordinates will not act on their own desires but 
because they have to fulfill the desires of figures who are considered to have high 
authority. This research reinforces the research of Lord and DeZoort (2001) and Davis 
et al. (2006). Research on social pressure usually only uses one type of social 
pressure or uses a combination of social pressure, our research made an empirical 
contribution to the development of social pressure literature by testing two types of 
social pressures (obedience pressure and peer pressure) and then comparing the value 
generated. 
The budgetary slack tends to be lower in the slack inducing compensation scheme 
compared to truth inducing. In line with the theory of expectancy (Vroom, 1994), when 
faced with maximum compensation, the subordinates will try to reach the budget target 
and make budgetary slack because they feel pressured for fines and penalties given. This 
condition causes budgetary slack to be lower than the truth inducing compensation 
scheme because subordinates do not feel pressured about fines given when they do not 
reach the budget target. Although the results of this research contradict research with 
Waller (1988), Chow et al., (1998), Steven (2002) and Fisher (2002), this research 
contributes to literature, namely explaining the phenomenon of budgetary slack through 
the expectation theory perspective and make empirical contributions in order to 
strengthen Young's (1985) research. This suggests that subordinates who face a high 
risk of uncertainty (penalties in truth inducing schemes), then subordinates avoid these 
risks (risk-averse) and tend to do budgetary slack compared to subordinates who do not 
experience uncertainty (slack inducing incentive scheme).  
The Indonesian Journal of Accounting Research – May, Vol. 23, No.2, 2020  
 
_______________________________________________________________ 
204 
 
The results indicate the absence of support for the interaction effect of 
compensation schemes on social pressure tumbling on the creation of budgetary slack. 
This hypothesis argument does not support for several reasons. In the context of social 
pressure on budgetary slack, the absence of moderation in the incentive scheme can be 
explained by a normative social influence perspective namely that social influence in 
the form of social pressure tends to be stronger to influence individual behavior so that 
compensation schemes are less able to mitigate social pressure towards the creation of 
budgetary slack (H3 not supported).  
In the context of social pressure on budgetary slack, the absence of moderation in 
the incentive scheme can be explained by a normative social influence perspective. 
Social influence in the form of social pressure tends to be stronger to influence 
individual behavior so that compensation schemes are less able to mitigate social 
pressure towards the creation of budgetary slack. Financial incentives play an important 
role in determining the moral framework due to perceived pressure on budget planning. 
However, personal values determine how individuals respond to these moral 
frameworks and determine what actions will be taken. So the decision to make 
budgetary slack under pressure conditions is not only based on financial incentives but 
also on the moral framework and personal value of each individual. 
 
5.2. Implication, Limitation, and Suggestions 
This research has theoretical implications that explain the compensation scheme 
methods to mitigate the phenomenon of budgetary slack through the perspective of 
expectancy theory (Vroom, 1994). Research provides practical implications that when 
individuals get stressed, the compensation scheme is less effective in minimizing the 
effect of social pressure on the creation of budgetary slack. Pressure from supervisor or 
high-level management become a threat for employee and affects their attitude, 
although there was not a penalty for their fault. Apart from any compensation, the moral 
framework and personal values are the most effective and efficient controls for the 
behavior of self-interest that should not be ignored by economists and accountants. 
Therefore, the organization should try another control beside monetary compensation 
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to create integrity work ambiance, in order to prevent budgetary slack creation in the 
participative budgeting process. 
Our research has several limitations. First, as with experimental research in 
general, this research has a weakness in external validity. However, the use of other 
methods such as survey is also quite difficult to do because of the limited number of 
companies that apply truth inducing compensation scheme. Research related to truth 
inducing vs. slack inducing compensation schemes has generally only been at the level 
of theoretical debate. Future research can use other compensation schemes such as 
clawbacks. 
Second, this research only compares two types of social pressure (Obedience 
Pressure and Peer Pressure). While other pressure, compliance pressure, was not 
examined in this research. Future research can consider comparing the magnitude of 
pressure from these three types of pressure. The interesting thing is, in contrast to the 
two previous types of pressure, some of the studies related to compliance pressure are 
aimed at reducing the occurrence of budgetary slack. 
Third, not all participants respond to social pressures according to the expectations 
of researchers regarding the treatment given. This is a natural thing in behavioral 
accounting because various dynamic factors influence the preferences of actors. Future 
research can be aimed at further research related to what factors cause individuals to be 
able to resist the pressure given, as well as differences in levels of moral reasoning, 
religiosity, and gender. 
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APPENDIX 
I. Experimental Instrument   
 
WELCOME TO 
PT. PRIMA JAYA OTOPARTS, Tbk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PT. Prima Jaya Otoparts, Tbk. is one of the national companies engaged in 
machinery and automobile parts. You have joined the company for two years and 
served as a MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTANT who is responsible for helping 
financial managers in strategic and operational decision making, including the 
preparation of budget proposals. You are also responsible for the results of decisions 
taken, including in determining the amount of profit targets at the beginning of each 
budgeting period. At this time, you and the company's finance department are 
preparing a proposal plan for the 2019 budget target.  
 
TRUTH INDUCING 
Realization of the budget for the last 3 years: 
Year Profit Target Realized 
profit 
Result Compensation obtained 
2016 13,1 Billion 13,5 Billion 
Target 
Achieved 
Salary + 50% bonus 
  from the salary amount for 3 months  
2017 14,9 Billion 14,5 Billion 
Target Not 
reached 
No bonus + get a salary reduction 
penalty of 10% for 3 months 
2018 14,2 Billion 14,9 Billion 
Target 
Achieved 
Salary + 50% bonus 
  from the salary amount for 3 months 
2019 Still in the process of budgeting 
 
 
 
 
 You 
Chief of Financial Officer 
Chief of Executive Officer 
Peer Peer 
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The Compensation Scheme that applies to the company is: 
A. If the company succeeds in achieving the profit target, then each employee 
will obtain a 50% bonus from the salary amount.  
Example: Your salary is IDR 10,000,000. Besides getting a salary, you will 
also get a bonus of 5,000,000 IDR from the company. So, the total income you 
earn is 15,000,000 IDR. 
B. If the profit tag is not reached, then the employee salary will be deducted by 
10% for 3 months as a penalty (fine) because it does not succeed in achieving 
the budget target. 
Example: Your salary is 10,000,000 IDR. Besides not getting a bonus, you will 
also get a deduction (fine) of IDR 1,000,000 IDR from the company. So, the 
total income that you earn is 9,000,000 IDR. 
 
SLACK INDUCING 
Realization of the budget for the last 3 years: 
Year Profit 
Target 
Realized 
profit 
Result Compensation obtained 
2016 13,1 Billion 13,5 Billion 
Target 
Achieved 
Salary + 50% bonus 
  from the salary amount for 3 
months 
2017 14,9 Billion 14,5 Billion 
Target Not 
reached 
Salary + Without Bonus 
2018 14,2 Billion 14,9 Billion 
Target 
Achieved 
Salary + 50% bonus 
  from the salary amount for 3 
months 
2019 Still in the process of budgeting 
 
The Compensation Scheme that applies to the company is: 
A. If the company succeeds in achieving the profit target, then each employee 
will obtain a 50% bonus from the salary amount.  
Example: Your salary is 10,000,000 IDR. Besides getting a salary, you will 
also get a bonus of 5,000,000 IDR from the company. So, the total income that 
you earn is 15,000,000 IDR. 
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B. If the profit is not reached, the employee only will get a salary without a bonus 
from the company.  
Example: Your salary is 10,000,000 IDR. So, you will only get a basic 
salary of Rp. 10,000,000 IDR, without any bonus. 
 
TASK. 
1. Your monthly salary is 12,000.000 IDR. If the budget target is successfully 
achieved, calculate how much total income per month that you will receive?  
 ……………………………………IDR 
2. Your monthly salary is 12,000.000 IDR. If the budget target is not achieved, 
calculate how much total income per month that you will receive?   
……………………………………IDR 
 
PRESENT CONDITION 
The best estimation analysis conducted by the company's research team showed 
that the company's profit performance could reach 15,500,000,000 IDR (Billion) in 
2019. The company's code of ethics requires every employee to be honest by entering 
the appropriate budget actual estimation.  
 
II. OBEDIENCE PRESSURE 
One day before the budget proposal is submitted, Mr. GUNAWAN, the financial 
manager who is your direct supervisor, (without the knowledge of the managing 
director) gives the order and forces you to make a budget proposal with a profit target 
that is smaller than the estimate, to only 14,000. 000,000 IDR (billion). This is done so 
that the company's target becomes easier to achieve so that all employees have the 
opportunity to get company bonuses. Mr. Gunawan threatened to give a poor 
performance evaluation and could even fire you from work if you did not follow his 
orders. However, you realize that this action is an act of cheating and harming the 
company.  
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III. PEER PRESSURE 
One day before the budget proposal is submitted, your accountant's peers, Mr. 
RIZAL & Mr. ANTON (without the knowledge of the financial manager and president 
director) urges you to make a budget proposal with a profit target that is smaller than 
the existing estimate, to only  14,000,000,000 IDR (Billion). This is done so that the 
company's target becomes easier to achieve so that all employees have the opportunity 
to get company bonuses. However, you realize that this action is an act of cheating and 
harming the company. 
 
BUDGET DECISION 
How much the profit budget that you will submit to top management? 
……………………………………… IDR 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
